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1External Finance and Debt - A Thematic Outline
’Jses/Magnitudes
A. Achieve Overall External Balance
• Minimum Imports (Visible and Invisible)
Consistent Operation Economy Present 
Level/Achieve 4% to 6% Growth
plus
• Actual External Debt Service 
minus
■ Attainable Exports (Visible and Invisible)
B. Stabilise/Adjust Overall Resource Position
■ Minimum Efficient Public Services Plus Public Infrastructure 
(Recurrent and Capital) - Bank LTPS estimate 30 to 35% of GDP (well 
above typical present ratio)
plus
• Enterprise Investment 
less
■ Recurrent Domestic Public Revenue
■ Enterprise/Household Cash Flow On Depreciation
■ Enterprise/Household Savings
Note - if economy is severely import constrained ex post domestic 
savings plus depreciation cannot exceed domestic content of gross 
investment. For fixed investment in SSA, national average direct and 
indirect import content in 50% to 67% range.
Note - for 6% growth requisite gross fixed investment likely to be of 
order:
Depreciation At
3 to 4% Capital Stock 10% GDP
Net Current Investment - say 
2.5 to 3 times growth
GDP 15-18%
Fixed Investment Needed 25-28%
- Real Working Capital - stocks of raw materials, goods in process, 
finished goods plus tools and spares must rise if fixed assets are to 
be used. Rough estimate of stock would be 25% to 33% GDP so for 6% 
increase require 1.5% to 2%.
2C. Schematic Summary Requirements (All %'s to GDP)
Total Public Services (Recurrent) 20-22|%
Public Services (Infra­
structure (Capital) 10-15%
Other Fixed Investment 12-18%
Working Capital (Real) _____3%
Public Services/Investment Requirement 47?-50%
Of Which Import Content
Public Services (Recurrent) 5%
Fixed Investment 15-20%
Real Working Capital li%
PS/I Import Content 22-25%
D. Schematic Summary Balances/External Finance
Domestic Revenue Government 15-20%
Enterprise/Household
Depreciation 5-7%
Savings 8-12%
Total 28-39%
Gap (Overall Resources) 10-20%
Visible/Invisible Exports 20-30%
Visible/Invisible Import Requirement
• Public Services/Investment 22-25%
■ Other 12-17%
External Debt Service 5-10%
Total 40-50%
Gap (External Balance) 20%
(These figures are schematic. The "Most affected" economies have 
larger ones.)
Stabs/Saps - Problems of Successes in Own Terms
A. Stabs (Stabilisation Programmes)
Budgetary Balance narrowed to net domestic bank borrowing level 
approaching 0. I.e., plugged external grants/soft loans
External Balance reduced to stability/rise reserves and stability/fall 
debt service arrears and external hard loan with external grants/soft 
loans plus debt service deferral (or write-off) plugging gap.
Neither is orthodox because neither can be assumed to be sustainable. 
But in typical SSA stab case attempting orthodox closure would 
effectively end public services and investment and (if 'sustained') 
lead to 'balance' not simply at much lower GDP level but on falling 
trend.
B. Saps (Structural Adjustment Programme)
Successes do raise output-exports-domestic revenue-capacity 
utilisation-investment-savings and (less clearly) consumption per 
capita, "efficiency".
3Do not significantly improve (nor address) poverty reduction.
Do not produce falling savings or current account deficits on trends 
which restore balance at low grant/soft loan levels. (See LTPS.)
Indeed usually 5 year projections "success" cases show constant 
absolute savings/external gaps (admittedly fall relative to GDP) and 
structural recovery's continuation to be dependent on their being 
plugged externally.
This is not original SAP concept nor rhetoric of Accelerated 
Development. But given necessity GDP growth above that of population 
from Year 2 or 3 of Stab/Sap, if those are to be domestically 
sustainable, versus possible export growth and "efficient import 
substitution" growth (structural rigidities, non-shiftable resource, 
terms of trade, market physical growth constraints) Bank sees no actual 
alternative but to slide forward external gap narrowing goal if in 
other aspects Sap economy is progressing successfully.
Basic Issues of External Financing
A. Adequacy - Quantitative
(Relative to targets for recipient economy or supplying agencies -
■ The formulation in first section is one set of targets but not all 
recipients/agencies share it and it may for whole of SSA breach 
feasible supply constraint)
B. Adequacy - Qualitative
■ Relevant to key constraints (e.g. a 1998 dam does not reduce a 1990 
fertiliser shortage)?
■ Smoothly flowing (e.g. if commitment is import support for 
sale/counterpart funds to basic services, do procurement-sales- 
recoveries-transfers-expenditures actually happen and - if so - 
expeditiously?
■ Engaging with key production sectors including exports/efficient 
import substitutes in household/enterprise sectors? (Results suggest 
not except for traditional export rehabilitation.)
C. Adequacy - Sustainability/Predictability
* 3 Years Rising/7 to 12 Constant (Real Terms) likely parameters 
success (e.g. Ghana 1983-1998)
• For budgeting efficiency need 3 year rolling 
frames of a. commitments
b. disbursements 
Overall and By Type/Sector
4D. Adequacy - Terms
■ Bottom Line (net inflow) key
■ If interest/repayment high, this raises inflow needed now and in 
future
• If severe "debt distress" (external and/or budgetary) logical case 
(administrative ease if nothing else) is high proportion grants/very 
soft loans
■ Reinforces need to do Overall External Resource Sources/Needs 
Projections including External Debt Service
Variations and Implications
A. Key Constraint(s)
External Balance (e.g. Ghana)
External Debt Service (e.g. Nigeria)
Domestic Savings Potential (e.g. Burkina)
2 or More (e.g. Sierra Leone)
None of Above (e.g. only e.g. in SSA-Botswana)
B. Time Frame for Reduction
Potentially Short (e.g. Namibia, Zimbabwe)
Medium Term Potential (e.g. Ghana)
Long Haul (e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique)
No Projection Possible (e.g. Sierra Leone, Zambia, Sudan)
C. Finance Types
Grants
Very Soft Loans (can build up severe external debt service 
burdens in long haul cases, e.g. IDA in Mozambique, 
Tanzania and presumptively Zambia, Sudan)
Guaranteed Export Credits 
For Botswana OK
Selective Use Quick Forex Earning/Saving Projects 
and Quick Gap Filling 
Market/Near Market Bank Interest Rate Loans - Long (15 years 
plus) Term
Potentially Usable Nigeria's, Angola's 
Same Problems as GEX 
Market/Near Market (IMF except SAF/ESAF)
Medium - Short Term
Genuinely Revolving 90-18 Day Trade Credit 
Highly Desirable to Use/Restore 
Other Unsuitable except as bridge to assured 
longer/softer 
Exception Genuinely/Predictably Short Term Shock 
Response (e.g. Botswana mid-80s shock)
5Conditionality
A. Doing Some Good
• For Recipient
■ For Donor
(in mutually acceptable ways)
B. Variations By Type
■ Humanitarian (access/channel to poor or starving only appropriate 
conditions)
■ Selected Project (ability to function/moderate limits all leakages 
needed)
■ Import Support (keep economy/public services functioning/time for 
serious strategy for adjustment-recovery. Implicitly belief such a 
strategy is being canvassed seriously.)
■ Programme/Macro Support Package (plausible strategy-commitment- 
efficiency-governance)
■ Sudden Non-Life Threatening Shock Relief (Analogous to Import 
Support)
C. How Formulate/Link Conditions
■ Steps To Be Taken For Finance (E.g. IMF Pre-Conditions and phased or 
"trigger clauses"); or
• Finance To Support Steps Already Initiated (this approach more 
compatible building domestic base for strategy transformation and for 
developing African Institutional capacity)?
■ Evaluation On Basis Action Attempted; or
■ Basis Results Achieved?
( problematic because formal actions unequal to serious, coherent 
effort. But results can be largely exogenous - e.g. war in 
Mozambique, drought in Malawi, cocoa price in Ghana determined at 
least in short run.)
Moral risk - high short run domestic cost action pushed by resource 
providers taken but no results, or horrendous side effects. What is 
adviser/funder 'obligation'? )
Particular Problematics
A. Projectitis
■ Ease of Presentation
■ Limitations in Absence Programme Support
6■ Failure to Consider Post Investment and Break In Period 
Sustainability (Maintenance and Operation Cost, Technology,
Personnel)
■ High Import Content (Inherent, ease of specification, donor habit - 
interest - bias)
■ Creation Imbalances Sectorally and Capacity/Bottleneck/Usable 
Capacity Contradictions
B. Balance
■ New Projects
■ Rehabilitation (Deferred Maintenance) Projects
• Maintenance (including Institutional/Personnel Capacity Building)
■ Programme (including Import Support)
■ Humanitarian/Emergency (including livelihood rehabilitation of 
displaced persons-refugees)
C. Enterprise
• Limits Government Capacity Conceptualise/Design/Run (both funder and 
recipient side)
■ Limits Private Fund Suitability
Initial Cost Profile
Projected External Balance Profile
■ Limits Private Fund Availability
"Climate" within Recipient State Control 
Market Buoyancy (absence limits probable profits)
Forex Availability Constraints Hamper Production -
Maintenance - Interest, Royalty, Fee, Profit Remittances 
(Latter two not withing recipient - or if LTPS 
correct anybody's - control)
« Possibility Mixed Funding
Enterprise Knowledge/Personnel
Part Enterprise Capital/Risk
Part Funding Government Loan To Enterprise
Part (defined) Special Risk Insurance Government to Enterprise
D. Accountability
• What data needed
e.g. in programme support how much on specific input/how 
much programme results overall? Does it matter whose basic 
drugs went where if overall clinic drug supply restored 
and wastage/'leakage' rates acceptably low?
■ In What Form
Funder Frame
National Frame of Recipient 
Both
7• Snag To Funder Frame
Not Uniform
Not Same As National Frame
Seriously Weaken/Deter Development of National Accounting- 
Transparency-Efficiency Analysis-Accountability To Civil 
Society Systems
• Possible Route
Strengthen National Systems
Require Reports in Their Terms (with limited side data)
Funder Transpose Reports into Own Format (has far more 
personnel/electronic processing capacity)
External Debt
A. Levels (Stock/Service Flows)
■ SSA Small Relative To World Totals
• Regionally Highest Relative To GDP/Exports in SSA
■ Default/Arrears Levels Highest (relative to stocks/flows) in SSA
B. Makeup
• Uneven (handful commercial/export credit - larger number mixed - 
majority governmental and international financial institution)
■ Virtually All Government Borrowed or Government (including Government 
Owned Financial Institution Guaranteed)
C. Estimate
■ Long/Medium Term Nearing Acceptable Levels Accuracy (Requires 
Crisis/Rescheduling Effort -)
■ Short Term Serviced/Revolving Underestimate (short term commercial at 
least until 1980s higher share SSA than globally?)
■ Short Term non-guaranteed/non-financial enterprises very weak 
estimates
D. Writeoffs/Reschedulings
■ Pragmatic Goals
Get most Back On Old Debt
Get Most Combined Back On Old Debt plus
Gains New Transactions (including non-monetary gains, 
e.g. reduction poverty, domestic-regional-global 
stability, avoidance deaths, development)
Second Usually More Rational Lender/More Desirable Borrower
8• In Context of Necessary (Net) Finance to Achieve Goals 
i.e.. Is delaying payments adequate?
How long?
Or must they also be reduced in present value terms?
How much?
E. Category By Category?
■ Near Total Write-off, e.g. Mozambique/Tanzania
contingently Sudan/Uganda/Sierra Leone
• Over 50% Write-off, e.g. Malawi/Ghana(?)
contingently Zambia/Swaziland
■ Significant Write-off, e.g. Kenya/Nigeria/Ghana(?)
(special problem because of makeup) contingently Cote d'Ivoire
■ Basically Major Rescheduling, e.g. Zimbabwe/Cameroon
contingently (?) Angola
■ Not Present Problem, e.g. Botswana/Namibia (first because of
economies strength and second because of limited present
external debt)
F. Write-off By Rescheduling
• Grace Period/Long Repayment plus Low Interest Does Constitute Partial 
Write-off (e.g. 10 year deferral at 2%, 20 years to repay at 3% 
constitutes over 80% real write-off)
■ For "Significant" Write-off Cases Can Handle By Such Reschedulings
• For "Over 50%" Write-off Cases Bizarre As Sole Instrument, as well as 
unsuitable (on those terms) for Private Debt
■ For "Near Total" Write-off Either Unworkable or Hardly Plausible 
(Defer All Payments 1990-2010 with 1% interest - repay 2011-2050 with 
1^% interest might be adequate if all new finance grant plus 10 plus 
25 years at 1%.)
G. Write-off By Sleight Of Hand
■ Cash Transfer To Meet Debt Service (occasionally provided/more 
frequently canvassed including by IFI's)
■ Import Support To Cover Virtually All Imports so Very High % Export 
Proceeds Can 'Service Debt' (e.g. Mozambique Debt Service - to 
Fund/Bank, occasionally commercial banks - 45% Visible and Invisible 
Exports plus Migrant Worker Remittances net of exporter retention 
allowances. About 90% visible/invisible imports externally financed)
■ When, why, how long, how much of this desirable, practicable, 
sustainable? Is it efficient for resource transferor or recipient?
9Modalities By Type Of Lender
A. Paris Club
■ Reschedule Arrears plus 5 years or All 1990s Payments On Pre-1990 
Debt (in full or in part) In One Go
■ Terms Up To 10 Years Grace at 1 or 2% On Balance Plus 20 Years To 
Repay At 2 or 3% (75-85% write-off at those terms)
■ Include Government Guaranteed Export Credits. (Pragmatic reasons 
plus nature most initial transactions as export boosting/resource 
transferor enterprise assisting.)
• Why 5 to 10 Years Payments at One Rescheduling?
Opportunity Cost To Recipient
(up to 15% senior finance personnel time devoted to 
near charade - nobody expects money to "come back" in 
real sense)
Desirability Projectable/Predictable Frame for Resource 
Reguirement/Source Modelling
Does Not Reduce "Conditionality" because High Write-off Cases 
all need New Resource Inflows too
Improves Climate New Private Investment and Short Term Trade 
Credit
B. Commercial Banks - Medium and Long Term and Long 'Stuck' Revolving
Credits
• Buyback at £.10 to £.25 on the £ (of principal or principal and 
accrued interest); albeit in "50%" or "Significant" write-off cases 
rescheduling plus fixed (say 8%) interest plus 20% to 50% write-off 
might be adequate and prudent.
• Banks have written down these loans (net of reserves) 50 to 80% on 
own books and do sell at very low prices
■ Absurd to 'expect' to get 100% back ever and/or to push whole write­
off burden on governments
■ Government or IFI soft loan or grant finance for buyback schemes 
(analogous to Bolivia Nordic/Netherlands commercial bank buyout and 
to Brady Plan plus)
Can be used as source counterpart funds but usability such funds may 
be constrained by inflation risk especially if boughtback debt was 
not being serviced so was overhang against future, not leakage of 
present, resources.
C. Commercial Banks - Revolving Commercial Credit
■ Working Capital of Trade - inaccessibility raise forex tied up 
prepayment imports and pipeline export receipts coming
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• Priority For Restoration
• Separable From Medium-Long Term and Long 'Frozen Up' Revolving Lines 
(Commercial Banks' practice bears this out.)
■ Possible Uses ESAF?
Clear Minor Arrears 90-180 Day Credit
Hold Portion ESAF Drawing to Guarantee New/Continuing
Credit Lines
D. Non Guaranteed/Non-Bank Supplier Claims Arrears
(Very substantial Nigeria and Francophonia. Significant Zambia and
probably Sudan.)
■ Not suitable long term/lo interest rescheduling (recipients wouldn't 
want to hold that kind of paper and not very marketable. Perceived 
cost to issuer above perceived value to recipient.)
• Commercial/Producer/Construction Firms have long since written most 
off and often 'recovered' by higher prices on subsequent cash in 
advance (or guaranteed export credit) transactions except perhaps for 
less evidently - in past - weak Francophone economies (notably Cote 
d'Ivoire)
• Buyback at £.1 to £.25 on initial payment due (analogous to 
Commercial Bank) case backed by grant/soft loan external funding 
least implausible approach. (No debtor not in "Significant" or 
higher write-off category has substantial arrears of this kind. The 
levels in Cote d'Ivoire/Senegal are likely to be very nasty surprises 
as both governments 'hid' external arrears not by blocking remittance 
of CFA payments which they could not do but by delaying CFA payments 
due foreign suppliers and contractors. This overhang has been seen 
and cited since mid-1980s by some observers who doubted apparent 
better fiscal/financial health of CFA economies/states. Not paying 
bills domestically is an alternative to borrowing from Central Bank 
in local currency and 'paying' but not remitting. It is almost more 
dangerous because it is less transparent as to overhang and delays 
appearance of inflationary/smuggling rise warning symptoms associated 
with open imbalances/arrears. An analogous problem exists 
domestically, e.g. Benin on paper has much higher real public service 
salaries and allowances than Tanzania or Kenya and does have less 
bank finance outstanding relative to revenue. But for bulk of public 
service it has built up 4 to 6 month salary arrears and has from time 
to time had 'voluntary' writedown - partial payment - special 
'savings' schemes. Less transparent fiscal problem plus apparent - 
but unclear as to reality - hi public sector wage problems versus 
transparent fiscal and actual low real public sector wage problems is 
not necessarily lesser or more easily resolved overall problem.)
E. IMF
• For Structural Adjustment/Transformation 7% to 8%, 3 to 8 year money 
is totally unsuitable. (Just think what the reaction would be if 
Tanzania proposed to borrow $200 million at 8%, 3 years grace plus 5 
to repay from any other source. Yet is has been urged to do that 
with IMF - and has wisely declined to use anything like that volume.)
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■ Therefore ESAF (1% - 10 year) should be used to:
i) roll over existing shorter term/higher interest drawings
ii) provide any net new IMF credit for supporting 
saps/transformation strategies
• But consider problem no SSA state (except Botswana) can call on IMF 
funds for their basic intended purpose:
i) short term crisis filling/bridging (when gap is 
self-correcting or can be corrected within 3 years and 
is - say - 1 to 3% GDP)
ii) rapidly, readily accessible (Zimbabwe's mid-1980s idea 
of repaying IMF in full and using other sources for long 
term finance to have first two IMF tranches available to 
cover short term crises superimposed on longer term 
problems was notably ill received by IFI1s main bilateral 
resource sources.)
World Bank/IDA
A. Convert past Bank window loans of "50%" write-off and above categories
to IDA. (Partially done or in progress.)
B. In crisis situations or in one-off shock cases provide 1 to 3 year 
access to IDA for countries normally on "Bank terms", e.g. Namibia 
1990-93, perhaps Cote d'Ivoire 1990-93. (Precedent Zimbabwe 1980-81.)
C. Mobilise additional (not out of basic IDA commitments) resources to 
finance such conversions/broadening of IDA access.
D. Have target of net inflow/transfer level (not just gross) for any SSA 
IDA or Mixed country.
E. In extreme cases (especially restarts from past collapses) mobilise 
third party resources to redeem arrears and possibly make part of 
service payments on pre-new start loans for a limited period.
(Relevant Zambia and contingently Sudan.)
Regional Development Banks (e.g. Afdevbank)
A. Logically Analogous To World Bank/IDA
B. Require Additional External Funding To Convert "bank" to "fund" window 
retrospectively
C. Need To Consider Making Poorest Members Purely 'Fund' Window Borrowers 
(or become very unattractive source for IDA/Grant recipient group)
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Enterprise Investors (including IFC-CDC)
A. Convert Portion Existing Loans
To Preference Or Ordinary Equity
Defers Payments Until Profits Earned 
Increases Chances Enterprise Recovery 
Recognises Limits Present Remittability
("If earned" - "income note" - or "payable if earned - cumulative as 
to balance" instruments might also serve if principal repayment was 
deferred until all interest had been earned or for phased repayment 
interest was current. These would not improve look of balance sheet
debt/equity ratios but would have comparable cash flow gains to and
raise less taxation issues than, equitisation.)
B. Ensure bearable (enterprise and economy) payment profiles for 
additional/new investments
Higher Equity Share (remittances only if/when earned 
and likely to begin later and lower than interest)
Greater Use of Payable When/If earned debt instruments
Greater Use of Interest Capitalisation for early years of
new venture/major expansion
C. Higher share of risk on external partner. (Same instruments as last 
section.) Maximum incentive to perform and to stick it out.
(If equity stake low and substantial portion recovered in 
construction/early operating year fees and charges while debt recipient 
and lending state government guaranteed external investor has little 
risk and relatively low incentive to stick out long haul, difficult 
recovery.)
D. These points increase case for transferor government loans to 
enterprises for part of such investments and for risk sharing against 
specified "abnormal" adjustment/recovery political and exogenous (to 
enterprise) economic risks on a specified basis.
(The above schema is based on SSA but is also relevant to other low/lower
middle income economies, e.g. Philippines, Fiji, Papua-New Guinea, Burma,
Nepal, Afghanistan, Morocco, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Bolivia, probably Peru, Ecuador.)
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